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1 Question 1.
1. As in the Ramsey model, we assume infinite-lived households maximising utility, given by
U =
∫ ∞
t=0
e−(ρ−n)t
[
c(1−θ) − 1
1− θ
]
dt, (1)
subject to the constraint
a˙ = (r − n)a+ w − c, (2)
where a are assets per capita, r is the interest rate, w is the wage per capita. The trasver-
sality condition is assumed to hold.
Firms have production function defined by
y = f(k) = Ak with A > 0, f ′′ = 0. (3)
Inada conditions are violated. In particular:
lim
k→∞,0
f ′(k) = A. (4)
Capital’s definition is broader, as it encompasses human capital, knowledge, public infras-
tructure, and so on, while labour’s definition is stricter, not being augmented by human
capital.
2. Consumer’s maximum problem is defines as
max
ct,a
H = u(ct) + λ
[
wt + (r − n)a− ct
]
. (5)
FOCs are
∂H
∂ct
= u′(ct)− λ = 0;
c−θ = λ; (6)
∂H
∂a
= λ(r − n) = (ρ− n)λ− λ˙
λ˙
λ
= ρ− r. (7)
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Taking the derivative of (6) w.r.t. t and substituting (7) into (8) yields
∂u′(ct)
t
=
u′′(ct)c˙
λ
=
λ˙
λ
;
− θ c
−θ−1
c−θ
c˙ =
λ˙
λ
;
c˙
c
=
r − ρ
θ
. (8)
Firms’ maximum problem is given by
max
kt
Π = Akt − wtLt − (r + δ)kt. (9)
FOC is
∂Π
∂kt
= A− (r + δ) = 0
r = A− δ. (10)
In a closed economy, a = k and w = 0. Substituting (10) into the households’ constraint
(2), we obtain
a˙ = (r − n)a+ w − c,
k˙ = (A− δ − n)k − c. (11)
(8),(11) are the equations that describe the dynamics of the economy. It can be shown that
k˙
k
=
c˙
c
=
y˙
y
=
A− δ − ρ
θ
. (12)
In this model there is no transitional dynamics: growth rates of consumption, capital
and output depend upon parameters (and not variables), such as saving rate and capital
productivity. Conversely, the Ramsey’s framework assumed that variations in parameters
would change volumes, rather than growth rates as in the AK model. This is due to the
fact that this model does not assume diminishing returns, which seems to be a rather
appropriate assumption for describing short-run features of the economy.
2 Question 2.
1. Romer’s model uses Arrow’s setup to eliminate the tendency for diminishing returns to
capital accumulation by assuming that knowledge creation is a side product of investment.
A firm that increases its physical capital learns simultaneously how to produce more effi-
ciently (learning-by-investing).
Production function for the i-th firm is given by Yi = F (Ki, AiLi), which is characterised
by diminishing marginal products of each input, constant returns to scale, Inada conditions.
However, Ai’s growth rate is not exogenous. Lt = L, hence labour is constant over time.
Spillovers are modelled as follows: once discovered, each piece of knowledge becomes ac-
cessible to all firms at zero cost. Hence, A˙i = K˙. We can then rewrite firm’s production
function as
Yi = F (Ki,KLi). (13)
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This means that, holding fixed K and Li, each firms faces diminishing returns to Ki;
however, if producer expands Ki, K rises accordingly and provides a spillover benefit that
raises the productivity of all firms. Furthermore, the production function is homogeneous
of degree one in Ki and K: that is, there are constant returns to capital at the social level.
2. Households’ maximum problem is the same as in Question 2. FIrms’ is defined as
max
ki,Li
Π = Li
[
F (ki,K)− (r + δ)ki − w
]
. (14)
FOCs are:
∂Π
∂ki
=Li
∂F (ki,K)
∂ki
= (r + δ)Li
r =
∂F (ki,K)
∂ki
− δ; (15)
∂Π
∂Li
=F (ki,K)− (r + δ)ki = w. (16)
Since firms are symmetric, ki = k and K = kL. Since F (ki,K) is homogeneous(1) in ki,K,
we can define the average and marginal product of capital as
APK =
F (ki,K)
ki
= f
(
K
ki
)
= f(L); (17)
MPK =
∂F (ki,K)
∂ki
= f(L)− Lf ′(L). (18)
Substituting (15) and (16) into the dynamic equations of consumption and capital respec-
tively yields
c˙
c
=
f(L)− Lf ′(L)− δ − ρ
θ
; (19)
k˙ = f(L)k − c− δk. (20)
This model also does not have transitional dynamics.
3 Question 3.
1. Accumulation of human capital is a direct consequence of physical capital accumulation,
hence this economy is characterised by the learning-by-investing effect.
Since human capital is an externality, generated by the creation of capital, we expect the
decentralised equilibrium to be non-optimal.
2. Exercise 3.2. is substituted by the following. Consider the social planner’s maximum
problem. Show that the decentralised equilibrium in exercise 2.2. is sub-optimal.
Social planner maximises social welfare (consumers’ utility and firms’ profit) subject to the
constraint given in (20).
k˙ = f(L)k − c− δk. (21)
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This is different from the decentralised constraint: here the social planner internalises the
technological externality of investment by taking into account the fact that each firm’s
investment adds on to the total stock of the economy, increasing other firms’ productivity.
The maximum problem is then
max
ct,a
H = u(ct) + λ
[
f(L)k − c− δk − k˙
]
. (22)
FOCs are
∂H
∂ct
= c−θ = λ; (23)
∂H
∂k
= λ(f(L)− δ) = (ρ)λ− λ˙. (24)
(25)
Finally, we get
c˙
c
=
f(L)− δ − ρ
θ
, (26)
that is greater than (19).
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